Satoshi Nakamoto Bitcoin Holdings Research: Insight into ...

Giving away Reddit golds to those who tell me a fact about btc i didn't know. (Being honest)

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Bitcoin Rhodium Mining Guide

Bitcoin Rhodium Mining Guide
Happy Mining!

All available XRC pools can be found on MiningPoolStats

Bitcoin Rhodium Mining Hardware

Baikal Giant+: 1.6 GH/s
Baikal Quad Cube: 1.2 GH/s
Baikal Giant: 900 MH/s
Baikal Quadruple Mini Miner: 600 MH/s
Baikal Miner Cube: 300 MH/s
Baikal Mini Miner: 150 MH/s

Mining Setup

To mine Bitcoin Rhodium you need to set up an XRC wallet and configure your miner of choice. You can choose between Web wallet, Electrum-XRC or Magnum wallet. To set up a web wallet please visit wallet.bitcoinrh.org. Or download and install Electrum-XRC wallet (recommended) for Windows, Linux and MacOS.
Web wallet: wallet.bitcoinrh.org
Electrum-XRC wallet: electrum.bitcoinrh.org
Magnum wallet: https://magnumwallet.co

Sign up for XRC web wallet if not yet done so

  1. Create an account, with your username, password and secure question.
  2. Sign in and click “Create Wallet”.
  3. Set up a strong transaction password. Make sure you store it securely in a secure password manager of choice.
  4. Copy the seed somewhere safe. It’d be a good idea to write seed on a hardcopy and keep it safe.
  5. Paste it to confirm you got it right.
  6. Grab an address for the mining step. Your wallet is now ready to mine XRC.

Instructions for mining XRC on the official pool

Pool link: poolcore.bitcoinrh.org
  1. Any miner that supports X13 will be able to mine XRC. We have a few examples below of miners that are well tested with Bitcoin Rhodium network.
  2. For any miner, configure the miner to point to:
(0–0.8 GH/s) stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3061
(0.8–2 GH/s) stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3062
(3–4 GH/s) stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3063
(5+ GH/s) stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3064
with your XRC address as username and x as password. You don’t need to open an account on pool. You will be mining to XRC address and mined coins will be transferred to your wallet
after blocks reach 10 block maturity
after you mined up minimal amount of coins (currently 0.1 XRC)
sometimes mined blocks could get rejected by network (orphaned) after they were counted as valid blocks. This is normal network behavior to follow longest chain
  1. http://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org is used to follow your miner and network statistics.

CPU Miner-Multi

Source: https://github.com/tpruvot/cpuminer-multi
Sample configuration with CPU Miner tested on UBUNTU.
{
“url” : “stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3061”, “user” : “YOUR XRC ADDRESS”,
“pass” : “x”,
“algo” : “x13”, “threads” : 1,
“cpu-priority” : 5,
“cpu-affinity” : 1, “benchmark” : false, “debug” : true, “protocol”: true, “show-diff”: true, “quiet” : false
}
Command to run your CPUMiner: cpuminer -c cpuminer.json

SGMiner (ATI GPU)

SGMiner is a GPU-based mine: https://github.com/nicehash/sgminereleases
The configuration below was tested on Windows:
setx GPU_FORCE_64BIT_PTR 0
setx GPU_MAX_HEAP_SIZE 100
setx GPU_USE_SYNC_OBJECTS 1
setx GPU_MAX_ALLOC_PERCENT 100
setx GPU_SINGLE_ALLOC_PERCENT 100
cd C:\Software\sgminer-5.6.1-nicehash-51-windowsamd64 sgminer.exe
— gpu-platform 1 — algorithm x13mod -url stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh. org:3062 — pool-user — userpass :x — auto-fan — temp-target 70 — temp-over- heat 82 — temp-cutoff 85 — gpu-fan 65–85 — log-file log.txt — no-adl — no-extra- nonce -P –T

CCMiner (NVIDIA GPU)

CCMiner is a GPU-based miner (NVIDIA)
Command to run your CCMINER:
ccminer-x64.exe -a x13 -o stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3062 -O :without -D — show-diff

Baikal miner

Settings: Url:
(0–2 GH/s) stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3062
(3–4 GH/s) stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3063
(5+ GH/s) stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3064
Algo: x13User: your XRC receiving address (make sure you set 2 distinct addresses for each hashing board)
Pass: x
Extranonce: leave off Priority set to 0 and 1
Once pool stratum address and your wallet as user are set up you should see your miner mining against XRC pool. When miner is working the status column is green. The pool and miner are incorrectly configured now as status says “Dead” highlighted in red.

Instructions for mining XRC on BSOD pool

Pool link: bsod.pw/en/pool/dashboard/XRC/
Use this code for your miner: -a x13 -o stratum+tcp://pool.bsod.pw:2582 -u WALLET.rig
BSOD pool allows both solo and party mining.
For solo mining use code: -a x13 -o stratum+tcp://pool.bsod.pw:2582 -u WALLET.rig -p m=solo And for party mining use: -a x13 -o stratum+tcp://pool.bsod.pw:2582 -u WALLET.rig -p m=party.yourpassword
NOTICE: You can use us for North America and asia for Asia instead of euin your .bat file or config.
You can also use BSOD pool’s monitor app for Android and iOS.

Instructions for mining XRC on ZERGPOOL

Zergpool offers low fees (just 0.5%) and also SOLO and PARTY mining with no extra fees.
To mine XRC on Zergpool use this command lines for your miner:
Regular: -a x13 -o stratum+tcp://x13.mine.zergpool.com:3633 -u -p c=XRC,mc=XRC Solo: -a x13 -o stratum+tcp://x13.mine.zergpool.com:3633 -u -p c=XRC,mc=XRC,m=solo Party: -a x13 -o stratum+tcp://x13.mine.zergpool.com:3633 -u -p c=XRC,mc=XRC,m=party
Use your coin wallet address as username in mining software. Specify c=SYMBOL as password to identify payout wallet coin, and the same coin in mc=SYMBOL to specify mining coin.
For more information and support please visit http://zergpool.com
Notice that when there are more pools mining XRC in different geographic/availability locations choose the nearest to you as lowest priority and then add desirable fall back pool options in different geographic locations or pools. This is useful when one pool experiences issues, to fall back to different pool in Bitcoin Rhodium network.

Calculate your Bitcoin Rhodium mining profitability

WhatToMine: https://whattomine.com/coins/317-xrc-x13
CoinCalculators: https://www.coincalculators.io/coin/bitcoin-rhodium

Feel free to ask questions in Discord community. There are lots of helpful people around the world watching XRC 24x7.

Bitcoin Rhodium Dev Team
submitted by BitcoinRh to BitcoinRhodium [link] [comments]

Weekly Dev Update : #2

Update from the devs!
The dashboard (https://testnet.explore.veriblock.org) is still catching up from the redeploy, but testnet is up and running. Here are the release notes. I'll also send an update once the dashboard is caught up.
== Change log 0.1.2 ==
NodeCore
CLI
PoW
PoP
== Action == Action: this is a breaking change to the protocol. Please download the latest rc.1.2 package, and update your nodecore instance.
To keep any coins you have mined, please copy over the wallet.dat file, as well as the other created files from the original nodecore directory to a new subfolder "nodecore\bin\testnet". If "testnet" folder does not exist, then please create it. If you do not have testnet coins that you're keeping, then no action required.
== Documentation == There is updated documentation on the wiki: https://wiki.veriblock.org These pages may be of special interest:
Reference:
How To:
submitted by VeriBlock to VeriBlock [link] [comments]

Bitcoin-development Digest, Vol 48, Issue 62 | Damian Gomez | May 11 2015

Damian Gomez on May 11 2015:
Hllo
I want to build from a conversation that I had w/ Peter (T?) regarding the
increase in block size in the bitcoin from its's current structure would be
the proposasl of an prepend to the hash chain itself that would be the
first DER decoded script in order to verify integrity(trust) within a set
of transactions and the originiator themselves.
It is my belief that the process to begin a new encryption tool using a
variant of the WinterNitz OTS for its existential unforgeability to be the
added signatures with every Wallet transaction in order to provide a
consesnus systemt that takes into accont a personal level of intergrity for
the intention fo a transaction to occur. This signature would then be
hashes for there to be an intermediate proxy state that then verifies and
evaluates the trust fucntion for the receiving trnsactions. This
evaluation loop would itself be a state in which the mining power and the
rewards derived from them would be an increased level of integrity as
provided for the "brainers" of a systems who are then the "signatuers" of
the transaction authenticity, and additiaonally program extranonces of x
bits {72} in order to have a double valid signature that the rest of the
nodes would accept in order to have a valid address from which to be able
to continuously receive transactions.
There is a level of diffculty in obtaining brainers, fees would only apply
uin so much as they are able to create authentic transactions based off the
voting power of the rest of the received nodes. The greater number of
faults within the system from a brainer then the more, so would his
computational power be restricted in order to provide a reward feedback
system. This singularity in a Byzantine consensus is only achieved if the
route of an appropriate transformation occurs, one that is invariant to the
participants of the system, thus being able to provide initial vector
transformations from a person's online identity is the responsibilty that
we have to ensure and calulate a lagrangian method that utilisizes a set of
convolutional neural network funcitons [backpropagation, fuzzy logic] and
and tranformation function taking the vectors of tranformations in a
kahunen-loeve algorithm and using the convergence of a baryon wave function
in order to proceed with a baseline reading of the current level of
integrity in the state today that is an instance of actionable acceleration
within a system.
This is something that I am trying to continue to parse out. Therefore
there are still heavy questions to be answered(the most important being the
consent of the people to measure their own levels of integrity through
mined information)> There must always be the option to disconnect from a
transactional system where payments occur in order to allow a level of
solace and peace within individuals -- withour repercussions and a seperate
system that supports the offline realm as well. (THis is a design problem)
Ultimately, quite literally such a transaction system could exist to
provide detailed analysis that promotes integrity being the basis for
sharing information. The fee structure would be eliminated, due to the
level of integrity and procesing power to have messages and transactions
and reviews of unfiduciary responsible orgnizations be merited as highly
true (.9 in fizzy logic) in order to promote a well-being in the state.
That is its own reward, the strenght of having more processing speed.
FYI(thank you to peter whom nudged my thinking and interest (again) in this
area. )
This is something I am attempting to design in order to program it. Though
I am not an expert and my technology stack is limited to java and c (and my
issues from it). I provided a class the other day the was pseudo code for
the beginning of the consensus. Now I might to now if I am missing any of
teh technical paradigms that might make this illogical? I now with the
advent of 7petabyte computers one could easily store 2.5 petabytes of human
information for just an instance of integrity not to mention otehr
emotions.
*Also, might someone be able to provide a bit of information on Bitcoin
core project?*
thank you again. Damain.
On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 10:29 AM, <
bitcoin-development-request at lists.sourceforge.net> wrote:
Send Bitcoin-development mailing list submissions to
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When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Bitcoin-development digest..."
Today's Topics:
  1. Fwd: Bitcoin core 0.11 planning (Wladimir)
  2. Re: Bitcoin core 0.11 planning (Wladimir)
  3. Long-term mining incentives (Thomas Voegtlin)
  4. Re: Long-term mining incentives
    (insecurity at national.shitposting.agency)
  5. Re: Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum
    block size (Luke Dashjr)
  6. Re: Long-term mining incentives (Gavin Andresen)
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Wladimir <laanwj at gmail.com>
To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 14:49:53 +0000
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Fwd: Bitcoin core 0.11 planning
On Tue, Apr 28, 2015 at 11:01 AM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille at gmail.com>
wrote:
As softforks almost certainly require backports to older releases and
other
software anyway, I don't think they should necessarily be bound to
Bitcoin
Core major releases. If they don't require large code changes, we can
easily
do them in minor releases too.
Agree here - there is no need to time consensus changes with a major
release, as they need to be ported back to older releases anyhow.
(I don't really classify them as software features, but properties of
the underlying system that we need to adopt to)
Wladimir
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Wladimir <laanwj at gmail.com>
To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 15:00:03 +0000
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bitcoin core 0.11 planning
A reminder - feature freeze and string freeze is coming up this Friday the
15th.
Let me know if your pull request is ready to be merged before then,
Wladimir
On Tue, Apr 28, 2015 at 7:44 AM, Wladimir J. van der Laan
<laanwj at gmail.com> wrote:
Hello all,
The release window for 0.11 is nearing, I'd propose the following
schedule:
2015-05-01 Soft translation string freeze
 Open Transifex translations for 0.11 Finalize and close translation for 0.9 
2015-05-15 Feature freeze, string freeze
2015-06-01 Split off 0.11 branch
 Tag and release 0.11.0rc1 Start merging for 0.12 on master branch 
2015-07-01 Release 0.11.0 final (aim)
In contrast to former releases, which were protracted for months, let's
try to be more strict about the dates. Of course it is always possible for
last-minute critical issues to interfere with the planning. The release
will not be held up for features, though, and anything that will not make
it to 0.11 will be postponed to next release scheduled for end of the year.
Wladimir
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Thomas Voegtlin <thomasv at electrum.org>
To: Bitcoin Development <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 18:28:46 +0200
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives
The discussion on block size increase has brought some attention to the
other elephant in the room: Long-term mining incentives.
Bitcoin derives its current market value from the assumption that a
stable, steady-state regime will be reached in the future, where miners
have an incentive to keep mining to protect the network. Such a steady
state regime does not exist today, because miners get most of their
reward from the block subsidy, which will progressively be removed.
Thus, today's 3 billion USD question is the following: Will a steady
state regime be reached in the future? Can such a regime exist? What are
the necessary conditions for its existence?
Satoshi's paper suggests that this may be achieved through miner fees.
Quite a few people seem to take this for granted, and are working to
make it happen (developing cpfp and replace-by-fee). This explains part
of the opposition to raising the block size limit; some people would
like to see some fee pressure building up first, in order to get closer
to a regime where miners are incentivised by transaction fees instead of
block subsidy. Indeed, the emergence of a working fee market would be
extremely reassuring for the long-term viability of bitcoin. So, the
thinking goes, by raising the block size limit, we would be postponing a
crucial reality check. We would be buying time, at the expenses of
Bitcoin's decentralization.
OTOH, proponents of a block size increase have a very good point: if the
block size is not raised soon, Bitcoin is going to enter a new, unknown
and potentially harmful regime. In the current regime, almost all
transaction get confirmed quickly, and fee pressure does not exist. Mike
Hearn suggested that, when blocks reach full capacity and users start to
experience confirmation delays and confirmation uncertainty, users will
simply go away and stop using Bitcoin. To me, that outcome sounds very
plausible indeed. Thus, proponents of the block size increase are
conservative; they are trying to preserve the current regime, which is
known to work, instead of letting the network enter uncharted territory.
My problem is that this seems to lacks a vision. If the maximal block
size is increased only to buy time, or because some people think that 7
tps is not enough to compete with VISA, then I guess it would be
healthier to try and develop off-chain infrastructure first, such as the
Lightning network.
OTOH, I also fail to see evidence that a limited block capacity will
lead to a functional fee market, able to sustain a steady state. A
functional market requires well-informed participants who make rational
choices and accept the outcomes of their choices. That is not the case
today, and to believe that it will magically happen because blocks start
to reach full capacity sounds a lot like like wishful thinking.
So here is my question, to both proponents and opponents of a block size
increase: What steady-state regime do you envision for Bitcoin, and what
is is your plan to get there? More specifically, how will the
steady-state regime look like? Will users experience fee pressure and
delays, or will it look more like a scaled up version of what we enjoy
today? Should fee pressure be increased jointly with subsidy decrease,
or as soon as possible, or never? What incentives will exist for miners
once the subsidy is gone? Will miners have an incentive to permanently
fork off the last block and capture its fees? Do you expect Bitcoin to
work because miners are altruistic/selfish/honest/caring?
A clear vision would be welcome.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: insecurity at national.shitposting.agency
To: thomasv at electrum.org
Cc: bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 16:52:10 +0000
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives
On 2015-05-11 16:28, Thomas Voegtlin wrote:
My problem is that this seems to lacks a vision. If the maximal block
size is increased only to buy time, or because some people think that 7
tps is not enough to compete with VISA, then I guess it would be
healthier to try and develop off-chain infrastructure first, such as the
Lightning network.
If your end goal is "compete with VISA" you might as well just give up
and go home right now. There's lots of terrible proposals where people
try to demonstrate that so many hundred thousand transactions a second
are possible if we just make the block size 500GB. In the real world
with physical limits, you literally can not verify more than a few
thousand ECDSA signatures a second on a CPU core. The tradeoff taken
in Bitcoin is that the signatures are pretty small, but they are also
slow to verify on any sort of scale. There's no way competing with a
centralised entity using on-chain transactions is even a sane goal.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Luke Dashjr <luke at dashjr.org>
To: bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 16:47:47 +0000
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of
increasing the maximum block size
On Monday, May 11, 2015 7:03:29 AM Sergio Lerner wrote:
  1. It will encourage centralization, because participants of mining
pools will loose more money because of excessive initial block template
latency, which leads to higher stale shares
When a new block is solved, that information needs to propagate
throughout the Bitcoin network up to the mining pool operator nodes,
then a new block header candidate is created, and this header must be
propagated to all the mining pool users, ether by a push or a pull
model. Generally the mining server pushes new work units to the
individual miners. If done other way around, the server would need to
handle a high load of continuous work requests that would be difficult
to distinguish from a DDoS attack. So if the server pushes new block
header candidates to clients, then the problem boils down to increasing
bandwidth of the servers to achieve a tenfold increase in work
distribution. Or distributing the servers geographically to achieve a
lower latency. Propagating blocks does not require additional CPU
resources, so mining pools administrators would need to increase
moderately their investment in the server infrastructure to achieve
lower latency and higher bandwidth, but I guess the investment would be
low.
  1. Latency is what matters here, not bandwidth so much. And latency
reduction
is either expensive or impossible.
  1. Mining pools are mostly run at a loss (with exception to only the most
centralised pools), and have nothing to invest in increasing
infrastructure.
3, It will reduce the security of the network
The security of the network is based on two facts:
A- The miners are incentivized to extend the best chain
B- The probability of a reversal based on a long block competition
decreases as more confirmation blocks are appended.
C- Renting or buying hardware to perform a 51% attack is costly.
A still holds. B holds for the same amount of confirmation blocks, so 6
confirmation blocks in a 10-minute block-chain is approximately
equivalent to 6 confirmation blocks in a 1-minute block-chain.
Only C changes, as renting the hashing power for 6 minutes is ten times
less expensive as renting it for 1 hour. However, there is no shop where
one can find 51% of the hashing power to rent right now, nor probably
will ever be if Bitcoin succeeds. Last, you can still have a 1 hour
confirmation (60 1-minute blocks) if you wish for high-valued payments,
so the security decreases only if participant wish to decrease it.
You're overlooking at least:
  1. The real network has to suffer wasted work as a result of the stale
blocks,
while an attacker does not. If 20% of blocks are stale, the attacker only
needs 40% of the legitimate hashrate to achieve 50%-in-practice.
  1. Since blocks are individually weaker, it becomes cheaper to DoS nodes
with
invalid blocks. (not sure if this is a real concern, but it ought to be
considered and addressed)
  1. Reducing the block propagation time on the average case is good, but
what happen in the worse case?
Most methods proposed to reduce the block propagation delay do it only
on the average case. Any kind of block compression relies on both
parties sharing some previous information. In the worse case it's true
that a miner can create and try to broadcast a block that takes too much
time to verify or bandwidth to transmit. This is currently true on the
Bitcoin network. Nevertheless there is no such incentive for miners,
since they will be shooting on their own foots. Peter Todd has argued
that the best strategy for miners is actually to reach 51% of the
network, but not more. In other words, to exclude the slowest 49%
percent. But this strategy of creating bloated blocks is too risky in
practice, and surely doomed to fail, as network conditions dynamically
change. Also it would be perceived as an attack to the network, and the
miner (if it is a public mining pool) would be probably blacklisted.
One can probably overcome changing network conditions merely by trying to
reach 75% and exclude the slowest 25%. Also, there is no way to identify or
blacklist miners.
  1. Thousands of SPV wallets running in mobile devices would need to be
upgraded (thanks Mike).
That depends on the current upgrade rate for SPV wallets like Bitcoin
Wallet and BreadWallet. Suppose that the upgrade rate is 80%/year: we
develop the source code for the change now and apply the change in Q2
2016, then most of the nodes will already be upgraded by when the
hardfork takes place. Also a public notice telling people to upgrade in
web pages, bitcointalk, SPV wallets warnings, coindesk, one year in
advance will give plenty of time to SPV wallet users to upgrade.
I agree this shouldn't be a real concern. SPV wallets are also more likely
and
less risky (globally) to be auto-updated.
  1. If there are 10x more blocks, then there are 10x more block headers,
and that increases the amount of bandwidth SPV wallets need to catch up
with the chain
A standard smartphone with average cellular downstream speed downloads
2.6 headers per second (1600 kbits/sec) [3], so if synchronization were
to be done only at night when the phone is connected to the power line,
then it would take 9 minutes to synchronize with 1440 headers/day. If a
person should accept a payment, and the smart-phone is 1 day
out-of-synch, then it takes less time to download all the missing
headers than to wait for a 10-minute one block confirmation. Obviously
all smartphones with 3G have a downstream bandwidth much higher,
averaging 1 Mbps. So the whole synchronization will be done less than a
1-minute block confirmation.
Uh, I think you need to be using at least median speeds. As an example, I
can
only sustain (over 3G) about 40 kbps, with a peak of around 400 kbps. 3G
has
worse range/coverage than 2G. No doubt the average is skewed so high
because
of densely populated areas like San Francisco having 400+ Mbps cellular
data.
It's not reasonable to assume sync only at night: most payments will be
during
the day, on battery - so increased power use must also be considered.
According to CISCO mobile bandwidth connection speed increases 20% every
year.
Only in small densely populated areas of first-world countries.
Luke
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen at gmail.com>
To: insecurity at national.shitposting.agency
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 13:29:02 -0400
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives
I think long-term the chain will not be secured purely by proof-of-work. I
think when the Bitcoin network was tiny running solely on people's home
computers proof-of-work was the right way to secure the chain, and the only
fair way to both secure the chain and distribute the coins.
See https://gist.github.com/gavinandresen/630d4a6c24ac6144482a for some
half-baked thoughts along those lines. I don't think proof-of-work is the
last word in distributed consensus (I also don't think any alternatives are
anywhere near ready to deploy, but they might be in ten years).
I also think it is premature to worry about what will happen in twenty or
thirty years when the block subsidy is insignificant. A lot will happen in
the next twenty years. I could spin a vision of what will secure the chain
in twenty years, but I'd put a low probability on that vision actually
turning out to be correct.
That is why I keep saying Bitcoin is an experiment. But I also believe
that the incentives are correct, and there are a lot of very motivated,
smart, hard-working people who will make it work. When you're talking about
trying to predict what will happen decades from now, I think that is the
best you can (honestly) do.

Gavin Andresen
One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud
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Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight.
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Bitcoin-development Digest, Vol 48, Issue 63 | Damian Gomez | May 11 2015

Damian Gomez on May 11 2015:
Btw How awful that I didn't cite my sources, please exucse me, this is
definitely not my intention sometimes I get too caught up in my own
excitemtnt
1) Martin, J., Alvisi, L., Fast Byzantine Consensus. *IEEE Transactions on
Dependable and Secure Computing. 2006. *3(3) doi: Please see
John-Phillipe Martin and Lorenzo ALvisi
2) https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/191.pdf One_Time Winternitz Signatures.
On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 1:20 PM, <
bitcoin-development-request at lists.sourceforge.net> wrote:
Send Bitcoin-development mailing list submissions to
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Today's Topics:
  1. Re: Bitcoin-development Digest, Vol 48, Issue 62 (Damian Gomez)
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Damian Gomez <dgomez1092 at gmail.com>
To: bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 13:20:46 -0700
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bitcoin-development Digest, Vol 48,
Issue 62
Hllo
I want to build from a conversation that I had w/ Peter (T?) regarding the
increase in block size in the bitcoin from its's current structure would be
the proposasl of an prepend to the hash chain itself that would be the
first DER decoded script in order to verify integrity(trust) within a set
of transactions and the originiator themselves.
It is my belief that the process to begin a new encryption tool using a
variant of the WinterNitz OTS for its existential unforgeability to be the
added signatures with every Wallet transaction in order to provide a
consesnus systemt that takes into accont a personal level of intergrity for
the intention fo a transaction to occur. This signature would then be
hashes for there to be an intermediate proxy state that then verifies and
evaluates the trust fucntion for the receiving trnsactions. This
evaluation loop would itself be a state in which the mining power and the
rewards derived from them would be an increased level of integrity as
provided for the "brainers" of a systems who are then the "signatuers" of
the transaction authenticity, and additiaonally program extranonces of x
bits {72} in order to have a double valid signature that the rest of the
nodes would accept in order to have a valid address from which to be able
to continuously receive transactions.
There is a level of diffculty in obtaining brainers, fees would only apply
uin so much as they are able to create authentic transactions based off the
voting power of the rest of the received nodes. The greater number of
faults within the system from a brainer then the more, so would his
computational power be restricted in order to provide a reward feedback
system. This singularity in a Byzantine consensus is only achieved if the
route of an appropriate transformation occurs, one that is invariant to the
participants of the system, thus being able to provide initial vector
transformations from a person's online identity is the responsibilty that
we have to ensure and calulate a lagrangian method that utilisizes a set of
convolutional neural network funcitons [backpropagation, fuzzy logic] and
and tranformation function taking the vectors of tranformations in a
kahunen-loeve algorithm and using the convergence of a baryon wave function
in order to proceed with a baseline reading of the current level of
integrity in the state today that is an instance of actionable acceleration
within a system.
This is something that I am trying to continue to parse out. Therefore
there are still heavy questions to be answered(the most important being the
consent of the people to measure their own levels of integrity through
mined information)> There must always be the option to disconnect from a
transactional system where payments occur in order to allow a level of
solace and peace within individuals -- withour repercussions and a seperate
system that supports the offline realm as well. (THis is a design problem)
Ultimately, quite literally such a transaction system could exist to
provide detailed analysis that promotes integrity being the basis for
sharing information. The fee structure would be eliminated, due to the
level of integrity and procesing power to have messages and transactions
and reviews of unfiduciary responsible orgnizations be merited as highly
true (.9 in fizzy logic) in order to promote a well-being in the state.
That is its own reward, the strenght of having more processing speed.
FYI(thank you to peter whom nudged my thinking and interest (again) in
this area. )
This is something I am attempting to design in order to program it. Though
I am not an expert and my technology stack is limited to java and c (and my
issues from it). I provided a class the other day the was pseudo code for
the beginning of the consensus. Now I might to now if I am missing any of
teh technical paradigms that might make this illogical? I now with the
advent of 7petabyte computers one could easily store 2.5 petabytes of human
information for just an instance of integrity not to mention otehr
emotions.
*Also, might someone be able to provide a bit of information on Bitcoin
core project?*
thank you again. Damain.
On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 10:29 AM, <
bitcoin-development-request at lists.sourceforge.net> wrote:
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Today's Topics:
  1. Fwd: Bitcoin core 0.11 planning (Wladimir)
  2. Re: Bitcoin core 0.11 planning (Wladimir)
  3. Long-term mining incentives (Thomas Voegtlin)
  4. Re: Long-term mining incentives
    (insecurity at national.shitposting.agency)
  5. Re: Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum
    block size (Luke Dashjr)
  6. Re: Long-term mining incentives (Gavin Andresen)
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Wladimir <laanwj at gmail.com>
To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 14:49:53 +0000
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Fwd: Bitcoin core 0.11 planning
On Tue, Apr 28, 2015 at 11:01 AM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille at gmail.com>
wrote:
As softforks almost certainly require backports to older releases and
other
software anyway, I don't think they should necessarily be bound to
Bitcoin
Core major releases. If they don't require large code changes, we can
easily
do them in minor releases too.
Agree here - there is no need to time consensus changes with a major
release, as they need to be ported back to older releases anyhow.
(I don't really classify them as software features, but properties of
the underlying system that we need to adopt to)
Wladimir
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Wladimir <laanwj at gmail.com>
To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 15:00:03 +0000
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bitcoin core 0.11 planning
A reminder - feature freeze and string freeze is coming up this Friday
the 15th.
Let me know if your pull request is ready to be merged before then,
Wladimir
On Tue, Apr 28, 2015 at 7:44 AM, Wladimir J. van der Laan
<laanwj at gmail.com> wrote:
Hello all,
The release window for 0.11 is nearing, I'd propose the following
schedule:
2015-05-01 Soft translation string freeze
 Open Transifex translations for 0.11 Finalize and close translation for 0.9 
2015-05-15 Feature freeze, string freeze
2015-06-01 Split off 0.11 branch
 Tag and release 0.11.0rc1 Start merging for 0.12 on master branch 
2015-07-01 Release 0.11.0 final (aim)
In contrast to former releases, which were protracted for months, let's
try to be more strict about the dates. Of course it is always possible for
last-minute critical issues to interfere with the planning. The release
will not be held up for features, though, and anything that will not make
it to 0.11 will be postponed to next release scheduled for end of the year.
Wladimir
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Thomas Voegtlin <thomasv at electrum.org>
To: Bitcoin Development <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 18:28:46 +0200
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives
The discussion on block size increase has brought some attention to the
other elephant in the room: Long-term mining incentives.
Bitcoin derives its current market value from the assumption that a
stable, steady-state regime will be reached in the future, where miners
have an incentive to keep mining to protect the network. Such a steady
state regime does not exist today, because miners get most of their
reward from the block subsidy, which will progressively be removed.
Thus, today's 3 billion USD question is the following: Will a steady
state regime be reached in the future? Can such a regime exist? What are
the necessary conditions for its existence?
Satoshi's paper suggests that this may be achieved through miner fees.
Quite a few people seem to take this for granted, and are working to
make it happen (developing cpfp and replace-by-fee). This explains part
of the opposition to raising the block size limit; some people would
like to see some fee pressure building up first, in order to get closer
to a regime where miners are incentivised by transaction fees instead of
block subsidy. Indeed, the emergence of a working fee market would be
extremely reassuring for the long-term viability of bitcoin. So, the
thinking goes, by raising the block size limit, we would be postponing a
crucial reality check. We would be buying time, at the expenses of
Bitcoin's decentralization.
OTOH, proponents of a block size increase have a very good point: if the
block size is not raised soon, Bitcoin is going to enter a new, unknown
and potentially harmful regime. In the current regime, almost all
transaction get confirmed quickly, and fee pressure does not exist. Mike
Hearn suggested that, when blocks reach full capacity and users start to
experience confirmation delays and confirmation uncertainty, users will
simply go away and stop using Bitcoin. To me, that outcome sounds very
plausible indeed. Thus, proponents of the block size increase are
conservative; they are trying to preserve the current regime, which is
known to work, instead of letting the network enter uncharted territory.
My problem is that this seems to lacks a vision. If the maximal block
size is increased only to buy time, or because some people think that 7
tps is not enough to compete with VISA, then I guess it would be
healthier to try and develop off-chain infrastructure first, such as the
Lightning network.
OTOH, I also fail to see evidence that a limited block capacity will
lead to a functional fee market, able to sustain a steady state. A
functional market requires well-informed participants who make rational
choices and accept the outcomes of their choices. That is not the case
today, and to believe that it will magically happen because blocks start
to reach full capacity sounds a lot like like wishful thinking.
So here is my question, to both proponents and opponents of a block size
increase: What steady-state regime do you envision for Bitcoin, and what
is is your plan to get there? More specifically, how will the
steady-state regime look like? Will users experience fee pressure and
delays, or will it look more like a scaled up version of what we enjoy
today? Should fee pressure be increased jointly with subsidy decrease,
or as soon as possible, or never? What incentives will exist for miners
once the subsidy is gone? Will miners have an incentive to permanently
fork off the last block and capture its fees? Do you expect Bitcoin to
work because miners are altruistic/selfish/honest/caring?
A clear vision would be welcome.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: insecurity at national.shitposting.agency
To: thomasv at electrum.org
Cc: bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 16:52:10 +0000
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives
On 2015-05-11 16:28, Thomas Voegtlin wrote:
My problem is that this seems to lacks a vision. If the maximal block
size is increased only to buy time, or because some people think that 7
tps is not enough to compete with VISA, then I guess it would be
healthier to try and develop off-chain infrastructure first, such as the
Lightning network.
If your end goal is "compete with VISA" you might as well just give up
and go home right now. There's lots of terrible proposals where people
try to demonstrate that so many hundred thousand transactions a second
are possible if we just make the block size 500GB. In the real world
with physical limits, you literally can not verify more than a few
thousand ECDSA signatures a second on a CPU core. The tradeoff taken
in Bitcoin is that the signatures are pretty small, but they are also
slow to verify on any sort of scale. There's no way competing with a
centralised entity using on-chain transactions is even a sane goal.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Luke Dashjr <luke at dashjr.org>
To: bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 16:47:47 +0000
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of
increasing the maximum block size
On Monday, May 11, 2015 7:03:29 AM Sergio Lerner wrote:
  1. It will encourage centralization, because participants of mining
pools will loose more money because of excessive initial block template
latency, which leads to higher stale shares
When a new block is solved, that information needs to propagate
throughout the Bitcoin network up to the mining pool operator nodes,
then a new block header candidate is created, and this header must be
propagated to all the mining pool users, ether by a push or a pull
model. Generally the mining server pushes new work units to the
individual miners. If done other way around, the server would need to
handle a high load of continuous work requests that would be difficult
to distinguish from a DDoS attack. So if the server pushes new block
header candidates to clients, then the problem boils down to increasing
bandwidth of the servers to achieve a tenfold increase in work
distribution. Or distributing the servers geographically to achieve a
lower latency. Propagating blocks does not require additional CPU
resources, so mining pools administrators would need to increase
moderately their investment in the server infrastructure to achieve
lower latency and higher bandwidth, but I guess the investment would be
low.
  1. Latency is what matters here, not bandwidth so much. And latency
reduction
is either expensive or impossible.
  1. Mining pools are mostly run at a loss (with exception to only the most
centralised pools), and have nothing to invest in increasing
infrastructure.
3, It will reduce the security of the network
The security of the network is based on two facts:
A- The miners are incentivized to extend the best chain
B- The probability of a reversal based on a long block competition
decreases as more confirmation blocks are appended.
C- Renting or buying hardware to perform a 51% attack is costly.
A still holds. B holds for the same amount of confirmation blocks, so 6
confirmation blocks in a 10-minute block-chain is approximately
equivalent to 6 confirmation blocks in a 1-minute block-chain.
Only C changes, as renting the hashing power for 6 minutes is ten times
less expensive as renting it for 1 hour. However, there is no shop where
one can find 51% of the hashing power to rent right now, nor probably
will ever be if Bitcoin succeeds. Last, you can still have a 1 hour
confirmation (60 1-minute blocks) if you wish for high-valued payments,
so the security decreases only if participant wish to decrease it.
You're overlooking at least:
  1. The real network has to suffer wasted work as a result of the stale
blocks,
while an attacker does not. If 20% of blocks are stale, the attacker only
needs 40% of the legitimate hashrate to achieve 50%-in-practice.
  1. Since blocks are individually weaker, it becomes cheaper to DoS nodes
with
invalid blocks. (not sure if this is a real concern, but it ought to be
considered and addressed)
  1. Reducing the block propagation time on the average case is good, but
what happen in the worse case?
Most methods proposed to reduce the block propagation delay do it only
on the average case. Any kind of block compression relies on both
parties sharing some previous information. In the worse case it's true
that a miner can create and try to broadcast a block that takes too much
time to verify or bandwidth to transmit. This is currently true on the
Bitcoin network. Nevertheless there is no such incentive for miners,
since they will be shooting on their own foots. Peter Todd has argued
that the best strategy for miners is actually to reach 51% of the
network, but not more. In other words, to exclude the slowest 49%
percent. But this strategy of creating bloated blocks is too risky in
practice, and surely doomed to fail, as network conditions dynamically
change. Also it would be perceived as an attack to the network, and the
miner (if it is a public mining pool) would be probably blacklisted.
One can probably overcome changing network conditions merely by trying to
reach 75% and exclude the slowest 25%. Also, there is no way to identify
or
blacklist miners.
  1. Thousands of SPV wallets running in mobile devices would need to be
upgraded (thanks Mike).
That depends on the current upgrade rate for SPV wallets like Bitcoin
Wallet and BreadWallet. Suppose that the upgrade rate is 80%/year: we
develop the source code for the change now and apply the change in Q2
2016, then most of the nodes will already be upgraded by when the
hardfork takes place. Also a public notice telling people to upgrade in
web pages, bitcointalk, SPV wallets warnings, coindesk, one year in
advance will give plenty of time to SPV wallet users to upgrade.
I agree this shouldn't be a real concern. SPV wallets are also more
likely and
less risky (globally) to be auto-updated.
  1. If there are 10x more blocks, then there are 10x more block headers,
and that increases the amount of bandwidth SPV wallets need to catch up
with the chain
A standard smartphone with average cellular downstream speed downloads
2.6 headers per second (1600 kbits/sec) [3], so if synchronization were
to be done only at night when the phone is connected to the power line,
then it would take 9 minutes to synchronize with 1440 headers/day. If a
person should accept a payment, and the smart-phone is 1 day
out-of-synch, then it takes less time to download all the missing
headers than to wait for a 10-minute one block confirmation. Obviously
all smartphones with 3G have a downstream bandwidth much higher,
averaging 1 Mbps. So the whole synchronization will be done less than a
1-minute block confirmation.
Uh, I think you need to be using at least median speeds. As an example, I
can
only sustain (over 3G) about 40 kbps, with a peak of around 400 kbps. 3G
has
worse range/coverage than 2G. No doubt the average is skewed so high
because
of densely populated areas like San Francisco having 400+ Mbps cellular
data.
It's not reasonable to assume sync only at night: most payments will be
during
the day, on battery - so increased power use must also be considered.
According to CISCO mobile bandwidth connection speed increases 20% every
year.
Only in small densely populated areas of first-world countries.
Luke
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen at gmail.com>
To: insecurity at national.shitposting.agency
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 13:29:02 -0400
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives
I think long-term the chain will not be secured purely by proof-of-work.
I think when the Bitcoin network was tiny running solely on people's home
computers proof-of-work was the right way to secure the chain, and the only
fair way to both secure the chain and distribute the coins.
See https://gist.github.com/gavinandresen/630d4a6c24ac6144482a for some
half-baked thoughts along those lines. I don't think proof-of-work is the
last word in distributed consensus (I also don't think any alternatives are
anywhere near ready to deploy, but they might be in ten years).
I also think it is premature to worry about what will happen in twenty or
thirty years when the block subsidy is insignificant. A lot will happen in
the next twenty years. I could spin a vision of what will secure the chain
in twenty years, but I'd put a low probability on that vision actually
turning out to be correct.
That is why I keep saying Bitcoin is an experiment. But I also believe
that the incentives are correct, and there are a lot of very motivated,
smart, hard-working people who will make it work. When you're talking about
trying to predict what will happen decades from now, I think that is the
best you can (honestly) do.

Gavin Andresen
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